The Report was published on 14 June 2017, is 70 pages long and was split into a number of sections, each one of which is summarised in turn below. This article provides a general overview with additional commentary at the end. The full Report can be found here.
The Panel
Annamarie Phelps (Chair):- Chairperson of British rowing
Jude Kelly:- Artistic Director of the Southbank Centre & member of the Cultural Olympian Board for London 2012
Stuart Lancaster:-Former England Rugby Union coach
John Mehrzad:-Sports & commercial barrister
Annie Panter:-Hockey bronze medallist at London 2012, member of the international hockey federation board and co-chair of the Athletes committee.
Scope of the Report (pages 7 – 12)
The Report is not a general review of British Cycling (“BC”) or a specific review of the allegations raised by the sprint cyclist Jessica Varnish (“JV”) – although these formed part of the Report (JV was a female sprint cyclist dropped from the World Class Programme (“WCP”) in April 2016 who made allegations of improper conduct against BC and Shane Sutton (“SS”) the former Technical Director). The remit of the Report was to understand whether there were fundamental behavioural issues that needed addressing within the culture of the WCP (the WCP is the elite program containing those athletes deemed the best medal prospects). The Report covered the Olympic cycle between 2012 and 2016.
NB: In the course of the investigations the Panel discovered allegations of financial impropriety and historical doping. On the financial impropriety the Panel pointed to the introduction in April 2017 of the UK Sports Code for Sports Governance which sets out the standards required for organisations funded by public money (See full details of the Code here). In respect of the historical doping, this was a matter for UK Anti-Doping.
Methodology (pages 15 – 19)
On 16 December 2016 a draft report was provided to the Commissioning board and unfortunately the contents of this report were leaked to the public in the spring. This was before the Panel had the opportunity to revise the draft under a process called ‘Maxwellisation’ whereby individuals named in the Report have the right to object before a final version is published.
NB: The outcome of the Maxwellisation process was that a number of individuals were not named directly in the Report (although we know who they are) and some of the language was changed. See article on the leaked report – Guardian – 9 March 2017
All interviews were confidential (44 were undertaken in total) and the Panel also received 180 written comments. The Panel aimed to make the process balanced, fair and consider the thoughts of those without grievances; however they noted that no one could be forced to contribute.
Key Findings
In addition to a summary at the start of the Report (pages 1 – 6), the key findings were split into three overall headings.
- Leadership (pages 20 – 33)
- BC Board
The Panel observed that whilst the BC Board had ultimate responsibility for the WCP, the WCP had a great deal of autonomy (indeed UK Sport had encouraged it). A former WCP leadership figure confirmed that because of BC’s medal winning success, the BC Board and UK Sport just let the WCP get on with it. A former BC Board member also questioned whether the unremitting focus on success was sustainable in the long term.
The Panel found there was a general feeling that after the medal success in the Beijing Olympics, the organisation was heading in the wrong direction. It was on this basis that an internal report (written by a former BC director Peter King) was commissioned in 2012 (the “2012 Report”). The four year period preceding the 2012 Report coincided with the creation of Team Sky (which would overlap with the men’s side of the WCP) and also SS’s temporary removal from the WCP in 2009 (for allegedly unacceptable behaviour). The fact SS went from almost dismissal to what some staff viewed as ‘untouchable’ on the eve of the 2012 Olympics, was a key reason it was felt the 2012 Report was required.
The 2012 Report talks of a ‘culture of fear, intimidation and bullying’ and of many interpersonal relationships being ‘untenable’. It goes on to suggest that ‘any semblance of management structure had clearly disintegrated during the last Olympic cycle’. In terms of recommendations it said that David Brailsford (“DB”) should remain as Performance Director (“PD”) whilst succession planning was put in place. The 2012 Report, in addition to not being distributed in full to UK Sport was not even fully distributed within BC (apparently only three people read the whole report). Approximately two years after the 2012 Report, in April 2014 (by which point DB had left BC) it was clear that not much progress had been made.
- WCP
It was apparent that the WCP was dominated by a number of key figures. This had proved an effective leadership structure during the early stages of the program (early 2000’s), and was ‘coach led and athlete centred’. However following the success of the Beijing Olympics and the new expectation of medals, there was a shift to a ‘coach led – coach centred’ approach (ie: the athletes were disposable). Athletes and staff were expected to toe the line, and many didn’t feel that Human Resources (“HR”) at BC had the authority to deal with their concerns (indeed many believed HR would report them to SS or DB – which in turn would lead to retribution).
The creation of Team Sky in 2009, saw DB’s presence within WCP reduced and SS became the de facto head of the WCP. The Report points out that SS was left to his own devices, there was an absence of checks and balances and he was not given training or support for the role of Technical Director from BC or UK Sport (Technical Director was a managerial position as much as a coaching role, and SS’s background was purely in coaching).
Midway through the Olympic programme in 2014, there was an increasing sense of disillusionment amongst staff, with intense pressure to meet targets or face the prospect of dismissal. Moral amongst staff was not helped by the use of confidential settlement agreements (Also known as Compromise agreements – they are commonly used to ensure a former employee does not pursue an employment tribunal claim against a former employer) which meant that the issues which led to staff dismissal were never addressed. Consistently staff described the WCP as ‘dictatorial’ where there was little chance of professional development and staff appraisals did not exist.
In addition, as is now well publicised, UK Sport operates a ‘cash for medals’ approach to distributing funding across all sports (Guardian – 15 August 2016). Whilst there can be little doubt about the effectiveness of this approach in terms of driving medal success, the Report questions whether this translates into an ‘ends justifies the means mentality’. In short, the nature of the funding formula means that creating a positive and balanced working environment is not rewarded in the same way as an environment which delivers medal success (the Report does stress that many of the interviewees believed that the WCP would win more medals if it had a better working culture).
- Relationships (pages 33 – 51)
- BC Board – WCP
There was a lack of accountability in the WCP. This was not helped by BC’s handling of the allegations made by JV against SS. There was a view that the BC Board supported SS regardless of the content of the allegations and that the grievance procedure was not properly followed.
- WCP leadership – WCP staff
Whilst the Report stressed that not all the interviewee’s responses were negative, generally there was a strong feeling amongst staff that you were either ‘inside the circle’ or ‘outside the circle’. In addition many staff members were under the impression that complaints would lead to reprisals, that the recruitment processes was opaque and they didn’t know on what basis people were hired or fired.
- WCP coaches – WCP athletes
The Panel looked at the Athlete Insights Survey’s from 2013 and 2014, and concluded that proper analysis of these surveys would have revealed a number of warnings. Between 2013 and 2014, in answer to the question ‘Morale is high amongst athletes in my sport’ the answer declined from 86% to 66%, a decline mirrored in other areas such as ‘confidence in the leadership’ and ‘effective communication’. There is little evidence these findings were acted upon and the athletes felt detached from the leadership of the WCP (in the sprint team in particular).
The Report looked at the selection process for athletes into the WCP. Whilst generally this process seemed robust, concerns were identified with how athletes were removed from the WCP and also the appeal procedure. In particular the Report questioned whether having only one ground for appeal (failure to follow the correct procedure) was adequate. Furthermore the athlete has to pay a deposit of £500 in order to appeal and there are further cost consequences if they lose the appeal. The Panel commented that the right to appeal should be unconditional and that the whole process of removal from the WCP was opaque (see recommendation 4 below). This was no more apparent than in the removal of JV from the WCP, who was seemingly viewed by the leadership as a troublemaker. The nature of her removal was made worse by the poor levels of communication (a consistent theme), with JV being informed of her removal over the phone.
In addition to the lack of professional support whilst in the WCP, the Panel also criticised the fact that athletes are left stranded when they left the WCP with no support mechanisms to assist them in a difficult transition to a ‘normal life’.
- WCP – UK Sport
UK Sport should not just be a source of cash for BC but should also provide oversight, something which it has failed to do (described in the Report as a ‘passive observer’). There should be a chain of accountability, with the WCP reporting directly to the BC Board/CEO and then any concerns being passed onto UK Sport as and when required. Whilst UK Sport has been hamstrung in terms of the lack of information it has received from BC, the Panel believed that there were warning signs which should have been picked up on and that UK Sport bears some responsibility for the failings outlined in this report.
- Environment (pages 51 – 57)
- No Compromise:- The ‘no compromise’ approach that UK Sport applied to providing funding is reflected in the ruthless approach taken by the WCP;
- Fear and distrust:- Many interviewees did not want their identities revealed and were convinced their thoughts would leak back to the BC Board. Whilst there was no basis for these fears, it illustrates the culture of suspicion in the organisation;
- Favouritism:- There was a perception that some athletes were particularly favoured;
- Discrimination:- There was a disparity between the treatment of some disciplines, although this perhaps reflected the nature of the funding model (ie:- more time and energy is put into areas with more medal chances). In terms of ‘Gender’ the Panel found the language used towards female riders was often crude and sexist, particularly from SS. However the Report once again criticised the fact that SS was not given proper training and support;
- Communication:- Communication across the WCP needs improvement and the decision making procedure is often unclear; and
- Rumour and conjecture:- Refers to rumours of financial impropriety and Doping (See earlier section on Scope of report).
Key Recommendations (pages 58 – 68)
The Panel made five overarching recommendations:-
- New Leadership
- BC needs a strong leader, prepared to implement the necessary reforms;
- The new CEO, need not be from a cycling background (indeed this may be preferable); and
- The new PD must report upwards and be accountable to the new CEO.
- Close monitoring and supervision
- BC and UK Sport must be engaged with the WCP, and UK Sport should build a relationship with the new PD;
- Recruitment to the WCP should be more transparent and all those leaving the WCP should conduct exit interviews to ensure any issues are identified;
- Even when settlement agreements are entered into, HR should take care to log any issues and raise them with the BC Board (not with the PD of the WCP)
- Training and Development
- Regular, confidential two way appraisals;
- Full training should be offered, with staff given the chance to develop their skills (particularly soft skills) and they should be empowered to suggest changes and innovate;
- There should be a full induction process for athletes entering the WCP;
- Athletes should be encouraged to take leadership roles, participate in decision making and consistently improve, with appropriate training and development;
- Consideration should be given to putting an athlete on the BC Board; and
- Psychological support for athletes should be maintained, but it should not a substitute for a positive culture within the WCP.
- Selection and communication
- Regular athletes review – all parties know where each other stand;
- Selection criteria should be clear and accessible to all;
- The £500 payment required to appeal should be removed;
- The grounds of appeal should be extended beyond procedure impropriety to cover breach of the selection policy (as published), policy misapplication or where the decision maker has shown bias;
- The process for the removal of athletes from the WCP should be clear and include pre warning of removal, the chance to improve, interim reviews of targets, and a final review of targets. If they are removed from the programme, the athlete is then given a full explanation;
- The policy for selection/non selection should be decided upon in consultant with athletes; and
- Selection processes should be reviewed every Olympic period.
- Conditional Funding
- Funding from UK Sport should be conditional on the above recommendations being implemented.
Comment
As alluded to, much has been made in the press about the difference between the draft report and the final report. The word ‘bullying’ which appeared in the draft report was left out of the final report, as were references to the former Performance Director David Brailsford. There have been accusations the Report has been heavily watered down or even that there has been a ‘cover up’. However in looking for a new scandal, there is a risk that the points made in the Report are missed, as despite the changes the Report is clear and unequivocal about the need for change within the WCP and its interaction with BC and UK Sport. Furthermore as the chair Annamarie Phelps has subsequently pointed out, the draft report was not meant to be published and was produced before the standard process of ‘Maxwellisation’ had been carried out.
The language used to describe the culture within the WCP in the Report is very similar to the 2012 Report (a copy of which can be found in the UK Sport link below). In terms of who is to blame for why the 2012 Report was not the catalyst for change, the Report looks at both BC and UK Sport. Responding to the Report the head of UK Sport, Liz Nicholl has acknowledged they should have done more but also criticised the lack of communication from BC commenting: ‘We should have pursued it, we should have demanded it. But we were unsighted. I had a long email from the CEO [of BC] at the time and I trusted it was full and frank’. Whilst it is important to recognise the significant failings within BC and WCP, this statement supports the Report’s assertion that BC and the WCP were trusted by UK Sport to get on with managing themselves and as a result there was no proper accountability. This self-regulation may have suited a small organisation (as BC was initially) but as it quickly grew a proper system of checks and balances should have developed alongside it.
Problems of accountability and governance are not just confined to cycling and can currently be seen across other sports (particularly those with an amateur background), for instance in Canoeing and Bobsleigh, where there have been allegations of sexual misconduct and a ‘culture of fear’ respectively. Furthermore when you compare the finding and recommendations made in this Report to the Duty of Care in Sport Report on which this blog reported on in May (Link here), the same issues come up; – the need for greater training and support both during careers and after, a lack of transparency in selection, poor communication, the need for a more prominent Athletes voice at Board level and a macho culture in sport (which reveals itself in the way athletes are treated).
Both the reports recognise that in order to affect meaningful change, implementation of recommendations needs to be linked to funding (see of recommendation 5 of the Report). UK Sport has a crucial role to play and it should not be afraid of utilising its power by reducing funding if the recommendations are not implemented. Like any business or organisation, the culture is set from the very top, so if UK Sport is ruthless in their approach to funding then it can hardly be surprising that this attitude trickles down through the system. In reaction to the Report, UK Sport has recognised the need to develop a more sustainable culture (UK Sport – 14 June 2017). However there may need to be a wider debate about adjusting the funding model to reflect factors other than meeting medal targets. For instance due to a lack of medal success, funding for Basketball is low despite some studies making the second most popular participation sport amongst teenagers. Given these teenagers are often from poorer socio-economic backgrounds, there is strong argument for increasing funding on the basis of the social impact, as opposed to purely medal winning potential.
Concluding on the Report itself, it should be another reminder of how far sporting institutions have to go to implement proper regulatory and governance structures. Putting these systems in place helps force culture change and ensures a solid platform to make the organisation more effective. If this does not happen, it could affect public trust in sporting competitions, may deter commercial partners and lead to more scandals in the future.
edwardjeavonssportslaw 